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Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and

the Metamorphosis of Lloyd Weinreb
George P. Fletcher*
My colleague has had a revelation. Professor Lloyd Weinreb's
views about larceny have undergone a striking transformation in
the last six months. As recently as May 1980, when he completed
the preface to the third edition of his criminal law casebook,' he
3
held one set of views about The Carrier'sCase2 and The King v. Pear.
In the article published in this issue, 4 he advances a different set of
views about the two cases he regards as so important. He gives us
no hint about how or why he underwent his change of heart. His
transformation warrants our attention, for by examining his conflicting positions, we shall come to appreciate another set of
discontinuities-those that, despite Professor Weinreb's views, in
fact shape the history of larceny.
I.

A Guide to the Issues
Virtually all of the cases in dispute conform to the same pattern
of activity. An owner voluntarily hands over his goods to D, whose
stated purpose is to use them for a limited time. D might plan to return the goods to the owner, or he might plan to deliver them to a
third party. At a subsequent time, as things turn out, D uses the
goods in a manner inconsistent with the owner's rights. He might
sell the goods to a stranger, or he might remove the contents of the
package he is supposed to deliver. In any case, he converts the
goods to his own use. In this course of events, it is important to
note, the only time at which we can directly establish a dishonest
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. My thanks for advice on substance and style to Guyora Binder, Dana Fellow in Comparative Jurisprudence, U.C.L.A.
School of Law, 1980-81.
1. L. XEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS xvii-xx (3d ed. 1980).
2. Y. B. Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 5 (1473), reprinted in 64 SELDEN SOC'Y 30 (1945) [hereinafter cited to the Selden Society reprint and translation].
3. 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (Exch. Ch. 1779).
4. Weinreb, Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and the "Metamorphosis of Larceny", 90
YALE L.J. 294 (1980).
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purpose is that of the conversion. The intention of defendant at
the time of receiving the goods remains obscure. Without extrinsic
evidence, such as a confession or an admission, we have no way of
knowing the defendant's purpose at the time of receipt.
With the enactment of statutes punishing embezzlement 5 and
larceny by bailees, 6 D could readily be convicted for his dishonest
appropriation of the goods while he is in possession of them. Prior
to those statutory modifications of the common law, however, larceny was the only applicable crime. In deciding whether D was
criminally liable, therefore, the courts and commentators faced two
agonizingly difficult questions. First, was D's conduct larceny? Second, if it was larceny, when did the crime occur? To the latter
question, there are two possible answers, and I shall refer to the
two possible moments of criminality as T, and T.,. T, is the moment when D first acquires physical control of the goods. T., is the
subsequent moment when he appropriates the goods to his own
use. The following chart diagrams the events in The Carrier'sCase,
in The King v. Pear, and in an important hypothetical problem that
I shall dub the "Clever Carrier's Case":
The Carrier'sCase

D receives the bales
on the understanding that he will
deliver them to a
third party.

D breaks open the
bales, removes their
contents, and
absconds.

The King v. Pear

D receives a mare
from the stable
keeper on the
understanding that
he will ride to
Surrey and back.

D rides to Smithfield
and sells the horse.

Clever Carrier's
Case

D receives the bales
on the understanding that he will
deliver them to a
third party.

D takes the bales to
Smithfield and sells
them to a third
party.

5. E.g., An act to protect masters against embezzlements by their clerks or servants, 39
Geo. 3, c. 85 (1799).
6. E.g., An act to make better Provision for the Punishment of Frauds committed by
Trustees, Bankers, and other Persons intrusted with Property, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 54, § 4
(1857). On similar American legislation of the nineteenth century, see 2 J. BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 857-871, at 476-83 (6th ed. 1877).
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The outcomes in these cases provide the basic data for our
discussion. In 1473, the King's Council concluded that the carrier's
conduct was felonious. 7 In 1780, the English judges came to the

8
conclusion that Pear's overall conduct was punishable as larceny.
We can also ascribe an outcome to the Clever Carrier's Case, even
though it appears never to have been decided, for virtually every
common-law commentator prior to the nineteenth century took the
position that the clever carrier should not be guilty. 9
If we take these data as our starting point, we confront the additional question, when did the crime in these cases occur? At T, or
at T 2? In the common law, the moment of criminality has always
been critical. The venerable principle of concurrence, requiring a
union of act and intent at one moment in time, finds its clearest application in larceny cases. In writing the Third Institute, which
shaped the common law of larceny, Sir Edward Coke grasped the
full significance of this required concurrence. It is worth quoting
two paragraphs in full, for these lines provide the basis for nearly
two centuries of thinking about larceny:

[Felonious taking.] First it must be felonious, id est, cum animo
furandi [that is, with animus furandi], as hath been said. Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea [no act is criminal unless
accompanied by a criminal intent]. And this intent to steal
must be when it cometh to his hands or possessions; for if he
7. The question whether the carrier's taking was felony was an incidental issue in the
case. The question put to the justices was whether the foreign merchant could recover the
goods directly from the "sheriffs of London." 64 SELDEN Soc'Y, supra note 2, at 34. All of the
justices of the Exchequer Chamber except Nedeham had concluded that the taking was not
felonious, id. at 32-33, and that therefore the owner should have his goods. The argument
against the owner before the King's Council was that the taking was felony and that therefore
the goods were forfeited as waif. The King's Council concluded, in effect, that everyone was
right: the taking was felonious, but nonetheless, the rules of forfeiture should not apply to
an alien who had secured a "safe conduct" from the King. A legal realist would interpret this
complex of views simply as the conclusion of least resistance: the justices in effect told the
"'sheriffs" that, even though the taking was felonious, they could not keep the goods. There
is no evidence, in my view, to support the conclusion that economic conditions explain the
holding that the taking was felonious. CompareJ. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 18-33 (2d
ed. 1952) with G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 68-69 (1978) [hereinafter cited with-

out cross-reference as RETHINKING]. Recognizing the exception to the law of waif evidently
furthered the interests of foreign merchants, but that aspect of the case has nothing to do
with the law of theft.
8. The case was tried at Old Bailey in 1779, but the judges did not deliver their opinion
until February 1780. The King v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 213, 168 Eng. Rep. 208, 209 (Ex. Ch.
1779).
9. Sre 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230; E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 107 (London
1644); M. DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 259 (London 1618); 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 504 (London 1736); 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 134 (London 1716); W. STANFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORON 25 (London 1557).
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hath the possession of it once lawfully, though he hath animum
furandi afterward, and carrieth it away, it is no Larceny: but
this receiveth some distinction, as hereafter shall appear,
Secondly, It must be an actual taking: for an Indictment,
Quod felonice abduxit equum [that he feloniously led away the
horse], is not good, because it wanteth cepit [the technical allegation of taking]. By taking, and not bailment or delivery, for
that is a receipt and not a taking: and therewith agreeth
Glanvil. Furtum not est ubi initium habet detentionis per dominum
rei. [Someone who has possession from the owner of the thing
cannot be a thief]. 10
This crisp account of larceny contains three important propositions, which I shall restate as applied to the above chart.
1. Larceny must occur at either T, or T.,. The thief cannot acquire possession twice, and if he acquires it at TI, he must
then have the animusfurandi to be convicted of larceny. This is
the principle of concurrence explained by the famous maxim
requiring a mens rea to render the act an actus reus. 1'
2. In The Carrier'sCase, larceny could not have occurred at T,
for the carrier obtained the goods by "receipt," not by "taking." Therefore, the felony must have occurred at T 2.
3. The clever carrier could not be guilty of larceny at either
T, or T., for at T, he obtained the goods by "receipt," not
by "taking," and at T.,, "he hath the possession of it once
12
lawfully."
These three propositions dramatize the significance of the finding of felony on the facts of the actual Carrier'sCase. If the clever
carrier would not be guilty, why was the behavior of the actual carrier thought to be felony? Coke provided an answer in the paragraph immediately following the two quoted above. If the carrier
"goeth away with the whole pack," he wrote, "this is no felony: but
if he open the pack, and take any thing out animo furandi, this is
larceny."1 3 Thus Coke explicitly followed Chokke's opinion in The
10. E. COKE, supra note 9, at 107.
11. Coke coined this established principle of criminal justice, id., yet nowhere did he discuss the mens rea required to render an act a "felonious taking," except, as indicated in the
quoted paragraphs, to say that the act must be animofurandi.As far as I can tell, Coke used
the mens rea maxim to make only two points: to explain the requirement of concurrence,
id., and to explain why someone non compos mentis could not commit larceny, id. at 108, or
criminal suicide, id. at 54.
12. This is the principle of possessorial immunity. For a discussion of the principle, see
RETHINKING at 81-83.
13. E. COKE, supra note 9, at 107.
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Carrier's Case that breaking bulk at T2 with the required animus
furandi defines the larceny. This account of larceny and of The
Carrier's Case appears in the work of all the major
common-law
4
commentators before the early nineteenth century.'
Using this guide to the issues and keeping clearly in mind the
reading of The Carrier's Case that prevailed from Coke to Blackstone, we can begin to examine Professor Weinreb's intellectual
odyssey.
II.

Professor Weinreb's First Theory of The Carrier'sCase

In the three editions of his casebook, published in 1969, 1975,
and 1980, Professor Weinreb took The Carrier'sCase and The King
v. Pear to be critical events in the "development" of larceny. 5 In
his comments on The Carrier'sCase, he adopted an explanation of
the case that stands flatly at odds with the statements of Coke,
Dalton, Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone. After partially reproducing the opinions of the judges,"6 the text poses a number of questions designed to undermine his distinction between the actual
Carrier's Case and the hypothetical Clever Carrier's Case, where
there would be no felony. What difference does it make, we are
asked, whether the carrier took the contents of the bales or "sold
them unopened"?' 7 The pedagogical point of this question becomes clear fifteen pages later, when the text discloses Professor
Weinreb's explanation for the finding of felony on the facts of The
Carrier'sCase. The thesis is that prior to the nineteenth century, the
case stood for the proposition that the felony occurred at T, that
is, at the moment that the carrier received the bales from the foreign shipper.' 8 If that had been the law, then there could be no
difference between the actual carrier and the clever carrier. Both
would have been guilty. The significance of breaking bulk or of
selling bales would have been merely evidentiary. Both acts would
have permitted an inference of dishonest intent at T.
14. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *230; E. COKE, supra note 9, at 107-08; M.
DALTON, supra note 9, at 258-59; 1 M. HALE, supra note 9, at 504-05; 1 W. HAWKINS, supra
note 9, at 134.
15. See L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 355-86. Because, from the first to the third edition,
there are no changes in that section of the book, reference in the text of this article is always
to the third edition.
16. The most significant omission is a speech by the Chancellor saying that the applicable
law was not the common law, but "the law of nature." Compare 64 SELDEN SOC'Y, supra note 2,
at 32 with L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 360. The omission is significant because of the considerable confusion that the Chancellor's remark suggests. See The Queen v. Ashwell, 16
Q.B.D. 190, 208 (1885) (Stephen, J., dissenting).
17. L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 362 (question 182).
18. See id. at 377-78.
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What is Professor Weinreb's evidence for this tenuous historical
claim? First, the argument relies heavily on the opinion of the
Chancellor in the King's Council,19 who reportedly said, "Felony is
according to the intent, and the intent here may just as well be felony as if he had not possession.""0 Second, the argument builds
on the views of John Kelyng, an obscure Restoration figure, who
did in fact believe that the felony occured at T,. Kelyng reasoned
that the carrier's removing of the contents of the bale and his
"disposing of them to his own Use declareth that his Intent originally was not to take the Goods upon the Agreement and Contract
of the Party, but only with a Design of stealing them."2 1 Apparently, Kelyng did not conceive of the possibility that the carrier
took the goods honestly and then changed his mind. In any event,
the statements of the Chancellor and of John Kelyng are the sum
total of the evidence that Professor Weinreb's text offers for the
apparent assumption that the common reading of The Carrier'sCase
prior to the nineteenth century was that the felony occurred at the
time of initial receipt.
Let us look at the evidence. First, the Chancellor's opinion does
not support Kelyng's theory of the case; nor does Kelyng rely on it.
Note the last six words of the Chancellor's opinion: "as if he had
not possession." By implication, the intent that "may be felony" is
an intent to steal by one already in possession. 2 It follows that the
Chancellor's argument is about the carrier's intent at the time of
breaking bulk. There is no plausible way to reconcile the words "as
if he had not possession" with Kelyng's belief in the relevance of
the carrier's intent at the time of acquiring possession. Thus, there
is no conflict between the Chancellor's view and Chokke's empha-

19. See id.at 378 (Prior to the nineteenth century, "a view like that expressed by the
Chancellor in the King's Council seems to have prevailed.")
20. 64 SELDEN Soc'y, supra note 2, at 31. Admittedly, Professor Weinreb's casebook does
not tell us precisely how he read the Chancellor's opinion. Yet his juxtaposition of the Chancellor's emphasis on "felony according to the intent" with Kelyng's thesis implies that he regarded the two as supporting the same proposition. See L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 377-78.
His article also supports this reading of the casebook; he claims that five justices "thought
that the carrier's intent was the critical issue." Weinreb, supra note 4, at 297. Because Huse,
Vavasour, and Laken do seem to locate the felony at the time of taking the bales, 64 SELDEN
Soc'y, supra note 2, at 31, 33, one can only assume that Professor Weinreb has always
thought that the Chancellor held the same view.
21. J. KELYNG, A REPORT OF DIVERS CASES IN PLEAS OF THE CROWN 82 (London 1789).
The Report was originally published in 1708. Id. at A3 (advertisement by publisher).
22. Fitzjames Stephen also adopted this reading. See The Queen v. Ashwell, 16 Q.B.D.
190, 208 (1885) (Stephen, J., dissenting) ('[The Chancellor] said that a misappropriation of
goods in the possession of the offender was as felonious as if they were not in his possession.")
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sis on breaking bulk, for it is at the later moment, as Blackstone
'23 It is poscorrectly perceived, that the "animusfurandiis manifest.
sible, of course, that the Chancellor would have found a felony in
the case of the clever carrier. Unfortunately, the lawyers of the
time had little chance to find out. A few months after The Carrier's
Case, it seems, the Chancellor 2 4 was dismissed from his office on
grounds of "incompetency. '2 5 "He had every bad quality of a
judge," Lord Campbell said. 6 Whether competent or not, his views
have had no influence on the formation of the common law.
The second source of evidence is the great Kelyng, 2 7 whose views
come to full prominence in Professor Weinreb's casebook. Without
citing any support, Kelyng did in fact conclude that the felony in
The Carrier's Case occurred at T, a conclusion that Holmes dismissed as one that "hardly can be accepted. ' 28 If Professor
Weinreb had cited and analyzed the common-law authorities, perhaps we could understand his reasons for singling out Kelyng as
primary authority. But the casebook does not directly cite any prenineteenth century figures except Kelyng. Why, then, this curious
attachment to a minor figure? The path to Kelyng is easy to trace.
Professor Weinreb's entire account of the history of larceny rests
on the discussion of The King v. Pear in East's Pleas of the
Crown'2 -the work that, in my view, began the process of
reinterpreting the common law of larceny. East relied on KelyngA0

23. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *230.
24. The Great Seal was delivered to Lawrence Booth, then Bishop of Durham, upon
the resignation of Bourchier on July 27, 1473. 1 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE LORD
CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 391 (2d ed. 1846). Stephen
concluded that therefore Booth must have been the Chancellor at the time The Carrier's
Cast, was discussed in the King's Council. The Queen v. Ashwell, 16 Q.B.D. 190, 208
(Stephen, J., dissenting).
25. 1 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 392.
26. Id. It is fair to add that, according to Lord Campbell, Booth "did not take bribes."
Id.
27. According to Lord Campbell, Kelyng "made up, by loyal zeal and subserviency, for
his want of learning and sound sense." 1 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES
OF ENGLAND 403 (1851). Kelyng's subjectivist theory of liability served him well in judging
suspected traitors. He was one of the few judges ever to argue that spoken words alone
would support a charge of "compassing the King's Death." See J. KELYNG, supra note 21,
at 15. While serving as Chief Justice of the King's Bench, Kelyng, according to Lord
Campbell, "exceeded public expectation by the violent, fantastical, and ludicrous manner in
which he comported himself." 1 J. CAMPBELL, supra, at 404. A criminal defendant once
cited the Magna Charta to him, but 'the only answer given by ... [the] Lord Chief Justice
of England was to repeat, with a loud voice, Cromwell's rhyme, 'MAGNA CHARTA-MAGNA
[F]xxxA!!!' "Id. at 154.
28. Commonwealth v. Rubin, 165 Mass. 453, 455, 43 N.E. 200, 201 (1896).
29. 2 E. EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (London 1803).
30. Id. at 687; see L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 373-78.
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Relying on East, Professor Weinreb apparently assumed that
Kelyng had accurately stated the view that prevailed prior to the
nineteenth century.
Professor Weinreb's uncritical reliance on East led him to another false historical claim. His casebook teaches that "most authorities up to the time of Pear's Case" reasoned "that the carrier's deviation from the contract to carry 'determined' the bailment so that
possession was restored to the merchant."3 1 That is patently false.
No one prior to East had argued that breaking bulk "determined"
the bailment. 32 East cited only Hale, 3 3 whom he misinterpreted.
Concurring with his predecessors, 3 4 Hale mentioned only one case
of "determining the bailment," and that was the case of the carrier
who, by delivering the goods to the appointed destination, terminates the bailment according to the original contract. 35
III.

Professor Weinreb's Second Theory of The Carrier'sCase
Professor Weinreb is undoubtedly right in his current view that
the significance of The Carrier's Case in the common law depends
not on the language of the diverse opinions, but on the way in
which the case came to be understood by the architects of the common law. Yet, in his review of the authorities, he appears more
concerned about fencing with a straw man than with setting forth a
positive thesis. He seems to think that I deny the necessity of animusfurandi in establishing common-law larceny. 36 This is a curious
interpretation of my published views.3 7 My argument is that the
doctrine of breaking bulk appealed to the common-law commentators precisely because the breaking provided such good evidence of
intent.
Now that he has reviewed the common-law authorities, Professor
Weinreb has some difficulty affirming his original view that the
carrier's felony occurred at the time of receipt. In particular, he
must explain why all the commentators insisted that breaking bulk
L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 377.
32. For my earlier exposition of this point, see RETHINKING at 103; Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REv. 469, 511-12 (1976). Apparently, Professor Weinreb
has not found my argument convincing, for he repeats his mistake in his article. See
Weinreb, supra note 4, at 299.
33. 2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 697.
34. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *230; E. COKE, supra note 9, at 107-08.
35. 1 M. HALE, supra note 9, at 505.
36. This misinterpretation of my views accounts for the repeated emphasis on "intent"
in Professor Weinreb's review of the common-law authorities. See Weinreb, supra note 4, at
300-01.
37. See RETHINKING at 7, 85-86, 115-22, 388-89; Fletcher, supra note 32, at 501-02.
3 1.
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was the felonious taking. In his effort to accommodate all the conflicting data in one legal formula, Professor Weinreb takes two
tacks. First, he blurs the distinction between felony in the receipt
and felony in the breaking. Note the obfuscation in this attempt to
argue that Kelyng and Blackstone really favored the same versions
of The Carrier'sCase:
Although they [Kelyng and Blackstone] looked on breaking
bulk as evidence of felonious intent, that fact was significant
not only in itself but also (and at least in Blackstone's case primarily) because thereby the delivery did not preclude a find38
ing of the necessary trespass.
Professor Weinreb's play on words is nothing short of brilliant.
Of course both Kelyng and Blackstone believed that, in The Carrier's Case, "the delivery did not preclude a finding of the necessary
trespass." The same phrase, however, stands for two radically different propositions. For Kelyng, the delivery did not preclude a felonious taking at the time of the delivery .3 That is, Kelyng rejected
Coke's basic dichotomy 40 between taking and receiving by delivery.
For Blackstone, as for all his noted predecessors, 4 ' the distinction
between taking and receipt represented the foundation of the common law of larceny.4 2 Delivery precluded larceny at that moment of
time. The doctrine of breaking bulk, however, permitted a finding
of felony at the subsequent moment of the breaking; 43 it is in that
sense, as Professor Weinreb reasons, that "delivery did not preclude a finding of the necessary trespass."
Professor Weinreb's maneuver consists in obfuscating the critical
distinction between larceny at T, and larceny at T.,. Yet if larceny is
possible at T, as Kelyng maintained, then the clever carrier is as
guilty as the carrier;4 4 if larceny is possible only by virtue of breaking bulk at T 2 , then, as Blackstone wrote, the clever carrier is not
guilty. 45 Though Kelyng and Blackstone represented diametrically

38. Weinreb, supra note 4,at 301 n.49.
39. See J. KELYNG, supra note 21, at 82.
40. See pp. 321-22 supra.
41. See note 9 supra.
42. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *230 ("[N]o delivery of the goods from the
owner to the offender, upon trust, can ground a larceny.")
43. Id. ("But if the carrier opens a bale or pack of goods, or pierces a vessel of wine,
and takes away part thereof. . .. these are larcenies; for here the animusfurandi is manifest.") (footnotes omitted).
44. J. KELYNr,.supra note 21, at 83 ("I do not see why disposing of the Whole should
not be Felony also.")
45. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *230 ("As if A. lends B. a horse, and he rides
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opposed schools of thought, Professor Weinreb tries to bring their
views under one verbal umbrella.
In his second eclectic maneuver, Professor Weinreb now seeks to
account for the doctrine of breaking bulk by relying on Chokke's
formal argument that the shipper delivered the wrappings of the
bales, but not the contents.4 6 The implication, according to
Chokke, is that when the carrier "broke open" the bales, he entered upon a domain over which the shipper retained possession.
47
This rationale now strikes Professor Weinreb as convincing.
Breaking bulk would appear to be the moment of felony "on the
ground that Choke14S himself stated, as an analogy to the earlier
cases in which a trespassory taking was found despite a prior delivery. ' 49 Of course, if Chokke's argument explains why the commonlaw commentators relied on the event of "breaking," then one
cannot maintain, as does Professor Weinreb's casebook, 50 that the
felony occurred at the moment of receiving the bales.
IV. Two Readings of The Carrier'sCase
In approaching a historical puzzle like the significance of The
Carrier's Case in the common-law tradition, we should recognize,
first, that the reading of the case might have shifted over time, and
further, that the reading adopted by particular commentators tells
us as much about them as it does about the case itself. My assumption is that the writers from Stanford to Blackstone adopted a view
of The Carrier'sCase that made sense to them. If the finding of the
carrier's felony had struck them as inexplicable, they would simply
have ignored this advisory opinion of the King's Council. That every important writer from Coke to Blackstone fastened on breaking open the bales as the moment of felony implies that this rationale of the case dovetailed with their conception of criminality.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the arguaway with him; or if I send goods by a carrier, and he carries them away; these are no larcenies.")
46. 64 SELDEN Soc'y, supra note 2, at 32 ("for here the things which were in the bale
were not given to him, but the bales as chose entire were delivered ut supra to carry etc.").
47. See Weinreb, supra note 4, at 303. In his casebook, Professor Weinreb described this
ground of the decision as "shaky." L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 377.
48. "Choke" is the law-French spelling for the English "Chokke."
49. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 303. This statement of Chokke's rationale is mistaken in
two respects. First, there is no evidence that Chokke relied on "earlier cases"; the cases he
used as analogies appear to be made up. Second, it is not true that Chokke held that there
"was a taking despite a prior delivery." The whole point of Chokke's argument is that the
shipper did not deliver the contents and that therefore the carrier's taking of the contents
was felonious.
50. See note 20 supra.
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ment that breaking bulk constituted the act of larceny no longer
made sense. Beginning with East, 5 1 one writer after another struggled to find a new interpretation of the case.5 2 They shifted their
focus from the breaking at T 2 to the intent at T, and began to see
the opening of the bales as merely one of many possible events that
would evidence a felonious intent at T,.5 3 They cast suspicion
on the original understanding of the case by developing the fiction that breaking bulk "determined" the bailment.5 4 That this
shift occurred is indisputable. Coke, Dalton, Hale, Hawkins, and
Blackstone stand for the traditional reading.5 5 East and Russell,
56
with Kelyng as a precursor, represent the new reading.
A shift in the reading of one case would not, in itself, engage
much interest. What is important is that this shift correlates with
analogous developments in the understanding of other doctrines in
the law of larceny. Later, I shall return to these developments, and
restate my interpretation of the general transformation in the
structure of larceny.5 7 In that context, I shall explain the relevance
of the two ideal types: manifest criminality and subjective criminality. Yet we need not invoke these ideal types in order to accept the
conclusion that something extraordinary happened in the history
of reading The Carrier'sCase.
That a major transition occurred in the history of interpreting
The Carrier's Case should render less surprising the reorientation
that Professor Weinreb has undergone in his thinking about the
case. In his casebook, Professor Weinreb identified himself with
East and the newer reading of the case. In his current article, he
adopts an eclectic posture and even finds an approving word for
the argument that he previously regarded as "shaky. ' 58 As we shall
see, this move toward an all-embracing, single doctrine of larceny
parallels the revision in his views about The King v. Pear.
51. 2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 697.
J. ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO PLEADING AND Evi52. See, e.g.,
DENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES *124; FIRST REPORT FROM His MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONERS ON
CRIMINAL LAW, in [1834] 26 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 121, 127; 2 W. RUSSELL, A
TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEAMEANORS 59 (5th Am. from 3d London ed., C. Greaves

ed. 1845). A number of other writers have also expressed their exasperation with the doctrine of breaking bulk. See T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMIION LAW 424
(4th ed. 1948) ("devious reasoning"); 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF
ENGLAND 424 (1883) ("obscure distinction resting on no definite principle").
53. See 2 W. RUSSELL, supra note 52, at 59.
54. Ste J. ARCHBOLD, supra note 52, at *124-25; FIRST REPORT FROM HIS MAJESTY'S
COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 52, at 127-28.
55. See, note 9 supra.
56. See notes 51, 53 supra.
57. Ste pp. 335-36 supra.
58. See L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 377.
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Professor Weinreb's Original Understanding of
The King v. Pear

The controversy about The King v. Pear, like that about The Carrier's Case, focuses on the time of felony: Did the larceny occur at T,,
when Pear mounted the horse, or at T., when he sold the horse?
As in the case of the carrier, there is authority to support both of
the conflicting answers. The original report of the case, published
in 1789, supports the finding of larceny at T 2.59 The later report
by East, published in 1803, supports the finding of criminality at
T,. 60 It should not surprise us that Professor Weinreb's original position on Pear replicates his original views on The Carrier'sCase. His
initial view was that both felonies occurred at T, the time of receipt.
The material on Pear in the casebook begins with a few lines
from the original report, 6 1 then quotes at length from East's report
32
of the meeting of the judges that issued in a finding of larceny.
East's novel thesis was that, for all cases of larceny, fraud could replace the traditional requirement of force in the taking.6 3 The jury
found that Pear had a fraudulent intent at the time of receiving the
horse.6 4 Therefore, according to East, the moment of felony was
clear: Pear committed larceny at the moment he received the
horse.6 5 Professor Weinreb evidently subscribed to that position,
for his casebook interprets Pear to stand for the proposition that
fraud takes the place of force in the required taking.6
East's proposition was radical. No one in the history of larceny
had ever asserted that, as a general matter, a fraudulent intent constituted the animus furandi required for larceny. As I show in my
comparative study of larceny, that proposition caused the commonlaw definition of larceny to diverge from the analogous crime of
larceny in France and in Germany.6 7 Indeed, East's theory of lar-

59. See The King v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (Exch. Ch. 1779) (Leach's
first volume published in 1789).
60. See 2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 685-89.
61. L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 373-74.
62. Id. at 374-75.
63. 2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 688.
64. 1 Leach at 213, 168 Eng. Rep. at 209; see 2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 686.
65. 2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 685 ("For if, under all the circumstances of the case, it
be found that a party has taken goods from the owner, though by his delivery, with an intent to steal them, such taking amounts to felony.")
66. L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 377 ("Pear's Case is regarded as the source of the
crime of larceny by trick, in which fraud replaces force as the 'trespassory' element.")

67.
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at 13-26.

Reply to Weinreb
ceny must be seen as the harbinger of the near collapse in English
68
law of the distinction between theft and fraud.
None of these extraordinary developments follow from Leach's
report of the case, which, more modestly, treats Pear's fraud simply
as a ground for refusing to recognize any transfer of possession to
Pear, thus making it possible to treat the subsequent conversion as
a felonious taking from possession. A line of cases and scholarly
commentary takes this report as authoritative. 69 In view of the obvious discrepancies between the two reports, one can only be baffled by Professor Weinreb's inability to perceive the difference between them.
A cursory reading of the two reports reveals these differences:
1. Leach:

East:
2. Leach:
East:
3. Leach:
East:

-[T]he parting with the property had not changed
the nature of the possession . . . [;] it remained
unaltered in the prosecutor at the time of the conversion .... 70
The report makes no reference to the stablekeeper's retaining possession.
The report explicitly states that the7 1felony occurred at the time of the "conversion."
Neither the word "conversion" nor any synonym
appears in the report or discussion.
The jury was asked whether, at the time of hiring,
Pear had "intended to sell the horse. 7 "
The jury was asked whether, at the time of hiring the mare, Pear had "an intention of stealing
her."

4. Leach:
East:

73

"The jury found that the facts above stated were
74
true . . ." (special verdict).
"The jury found the prisoner guilty" (general ver75
dict).

68. See Lawrence v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1971] 3 W.L.R. 225, [1971] 2 All
E.R. 1253 (H.L.) (theft under 1968 statute overlaps obtaining property by deception);
Elliott, Three Problems in the Law of Theft, 9 MELBOURNE U.L. REv. 448, 449-56 (1974) (discussing overlap of two offenses in English law).
69. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. 96, 89 S.W. 160 (1905) (no conversion of hired horse and buggy if defendant pledged it with intent to redeem it); Regina v.
Brooks, 173 Eng. Rep. 501 (1837) (offer to sell goods, without actual conversion, insufficient for finding of felony); 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 52, at 160 ("the subsequent conversion [is regarded] as theft").
70. 1 Leach at 213-14, 168 Eng. Rep. at 209.
71. Id. at 213-14, 168 Eng. Rep. at 209.
72. Id. at 213, 168 Eng. Rep. at 209 (emphasis added).
73. 2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 686.
74. 1 Leach at 213, 168 Eng. Rep. at 209.
75. 2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 686.
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Professor Weinreb overlooked those clear differences 76 because
he was committed to the view that, in The Carrier'sCase, the felony
occurred at T, the moment of acquisition. In East's version of
Pear, he found confirmation of what he took to be the only rational
reading of both The Carrier's Case and Pear. Yet, in adjusting his
reading of history to his conception of good law, he ignored the
differences between the two reports, thus effacing data that are important for understanding the complexity of Anglo-American legal
history.
VI.

Professor Weinreb's Revised Theory of The King v. Pear
To support his view that there is no difference between the two
reports of Pear, Professor Weinreb now advances a new interpretation of the case. His thesis now is that the larceny occurs at T, the
time of receipt, but is not complete until T.,, the time of conversion. 77 The new thesis, in other words, seeks to merge the two versions of Pear. This claim is nothing if not novel. If Professor
Weinreb now thinks it undesirable to locate the crime at the moment Pear mounts the horse, 7 8 then he should shift his reading to
Leach's report. Yet he continues to rely on East, even as he asserts
that a conversion is an essential condition of "larceny by trick."
East unequivocally committed himself to the view that the larceny occurs at the time of receipt if the suspect then has an "intent
to steal. 79 Professor Weinreb recognizes that East was silent on the
supposed requirement of a conversion, for he writes, "Far from
eliminating that requirement [of conversion], East plainly took it
for granted."8 0 Yet he senses that this argument might not be persuasive. He therefore seeks some language from East that might
support his theory. He argues as follows: "Discussing the facts of
the case, he [East] says that 'the obtaining the possession of the
mare, and afterwards disposing of her in the manner stated' was a trespass, which, accompanied by 'felonious intent at the time of obtaining the possession,' constituted larceny at common law." 8'
76. Another important difference is that Leach's report describes the receipt of the
horse as "fraudulent." 1 Leach at 213, 168 Eng. Rep. at 209. According to State v.
Coombs, 55 Me. 477 (1867), a tortious taking might be "fraudulent," but it need not be felonious. East and Weinreb, however, read "fraudulent" as equivalent to "felonious." See p.
330 supra.
77. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 306.
78. See id. at 307-08.
79. See note 65 supra.
80. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 307.
81. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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This argument, I regret to say, falsifies the record. What East in
fact wrote was this:
That the obtaining the possession of the mare, and afterwards
disposing of her in the manner stated, was in the construction
of law such a taking as would have made the prisoner liable to
an action of trespass at the suit of the owner, if he had not in82
tended to steal her.
Professor Weinreb misleadingly revised this statement in two respects. First, he changed the reference from an "action of trespass"
to "trespass," thus suggesting that East was talking about the
"trespassory" taking required for larceny, rather than about the
civil action for trespass. Second, he changed the negative "if he had
not intended to steal her" to the positive "accompanied by 'felonious intent at the time of obtaining,'" thus suggesting that East was
discussing the elements of larceny.
If there is no criminal intent at the time of the taking, then, of
course, the actor must do something to make himself liable in a private action for trespass. "Disposing of the horse" fulfills this requirement. If that is true for the private action, East reasons,
"[t]here could be no doubt but that in this case, where the felonious
intent at the time of obtaining the possession was found by the
jury, that it was felony by the common law."'8 3 East's reasoning contains absolutely no suggestion that "disposing of the horse" was essential in the theory of felony. A disposition was necessary for the
private action of trespass, and that is why East mentioned it while
discussing the private action. It was not necessary in the theory of
felony, and that is why East did not mention it in that context.
In presenting evidence to support his thesis, Professor Weinreb
84
misrepresents another important text as well. In Regina v. Brooks,
the court held that, even though the defendant offered to sell the
goods, there was "no actual conversion of the property, and only
an offer to sell . .
. [T]herefore, . . . the prisoner must be
8'
5
acquitted."
In the third English edition of Russell's Treatise on
Crimes and Misdemeanors, the editor, Charles Greaves, included a
long footnote criticizing the rationale of Brooks. Greaves reasoned
that "although no actual conversion took place, ' '8 6 the case should
82.
83.
84.
85.

173 Eng. Rep. 501 (1837).
Id. at 502.

86.

2 W. RUSSELL, supra note 52, at 54 n.r.

2 E. EAST, supra note 29, at 688 (emphasis added).

Id.
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still have gone to the jury. "An actual conversion," he said, "is undoubtedly cogent evidence that the chattel was originally obtained
for that purpose; but it is only evidence . . .,,8
Despite this clear language, Professor Weinreb holds the view
that Greaves remained "[flar from eliminating the requirement of
conversion. 8 8s The fact is that the theory conceived by East,
and advanced by Russell and Greaves, disposed of the requirement
of conversion found in Leach's version of Pear. This modern
theory eventually found its way into the Larceny Act of 1916,
which treats "obtaining the possession 'by any trick' " as one of four
special ways of "taking" the property of another.8 9 There is, of
course, no requirement of a conversion.
Professor Weinreb's primary concern has been to avoid admitting that there are conflicting theories of either The Carrier'sCase or
of The King v. Pear. He is impelled, therefore, to find a single, general formula for reconciling his earlier views with the obvious evidence of contrary readings. Abandoning his initial mistake in
locating the felony at the time of receipt, he has failed in his efforts
to find a synthesis of felony in the receipt and felony in the breaking, or conversion. As long as he seeks consistency across all the
cases and across all periods in our history, Professor Weinreb is
doomed to move from one mistaken general formula to another.9 0
VII.

Discontinuities in the History of Larceny
An interpretive theory speaks to us only if we are troubled by
problematic data. If one ignores the data, as Professor Weinreb has
done, then surely the interpretation will fall on covered ears. In the
history of larceny, the critical data are the discontinuities between
87. Id.
88. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 308 n.75. Greaves gave an alternative argument at the
end of his footnote, but Professor Weinreb ignores it. After setting forth his preferred
view of the problem, Greaves continued: "It seems difficult also to see how the fact that
Mr. Orbell did not intend to complete the contract could vary the effect of the prisoner's
acts; the prisoner had done all on his part to complete the contract, and as against him it
might well have been held that the conversion was complete." 2 W. RUSSELL, Supra note 52,
at 54 n.r (emphasis added). Greaves did not argue that there was a conversion, but
merely that from the perspective of the defendant's guilt, the offer to sell was as good as a
conversion: an offer to sell and an actual conversion would be equally strong evidence that
the defendant intended to steal at the moment of receipt.
89. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 1(2)(i)(a).
90. In his study of larceny, Professor Weinreb does make two important points. First,
he correctly stresses that the doctrine of in fraudem legis was a precursor to East's reading
of Pear. See Weinreb, supra note 4, at 302 n.54. Second, he points out that Blackstone recognized that there might be cases of larceny other than the core cases of clandestine takings, and that, in those cases, the prosecution might have to rely on suspicious behavior
after the taking in order to prove the animusfurandi. Id. at 300-01.
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the traditional view and the modern view. Among these are the following:
1. The Carrier'sCase
A. Traditional view: The larceny occurred at T.2, when the
carrier broke open the bales."'
B. Modern view: The larceny occurred at T, when the
2
carrier received the bales."
2. The King v. Pear
A. Traditional view: The larcency occurred at T., when
Pear sold the mare.9 3
B. Modern view: The larceny occurred at T,, when Pear
hired the mare. 4
3. Color and Claim of Right
A. Traditional view: The actor had to have an observable
color of right for his taking not to be felonious.9 5
B. Modern view: There is no felony if the actor has a subjective claim of right, "however
puerile or mistaken
': 6
the claim may in fact be."
4. The Relevance of Delivery
A. Traditional view: If the prior possessor voluntarily delivered the goods to the suspect, the latter's receipt of the
:7
goods could not constitute a punishable taking.
B. Modern view: Voluntary delivery does not prevent the
receipt from constituting a taking. 8 The leading case is
The Queen v. Middleton, in which the defendant received
excess funds from a bank teller and was convicted for larceny in the act of receiving the funds with animus
furandi."

91.
92.
93.
94.

See
See
See
See

pp. 322-23supra.
p. 329 supra.
p. 331 supra.
p. 330 supra.

95. Set, 4 XV. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *232; 1 M. HALE, supra note 9, at 509. Hale
noted that a color of right might be only "'a trick to colour a felony." Id.
96. 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 6, § 851, at 474 (footnote omitted); see State v. Sawyer, 95
Conn. 34, 38, 110 A. 461, 463 (1920); People v. Hillhouse, 80 Mich. 580, 586, 45 N.W.
484, 486-87 (1890); Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 1(1) (larceny negated by
"'claim of right"). There is no support in the common-law texts for the principle that a subjective claim of right, however irrational, should preclude liability for larceny.
97. See pp. 321-22 supra.
98. See note 65 supra. The Larceny Act of 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 1(2)(i), lists three
ways-by trick, by intimidation, and by mistake of the owner-of taking feloniously with
the nominal consent of the owner.
99. The Queen v. Middleton, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 38 (1873) (larceny in feloniously
receiving excess funds from bank teller); see RETHINKING at 107-10 (discussing case).
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The Relevance of Trespass
A. Traditional view: Although the common-law commentators do not always mention the requirement, the general
view seems to have been that a felonious taking required
a trespass in the taking.' 0 0
B. Modern view: Trespass is irrelevant. None of the cases
expanding liability mentions the concept, 10 ' and the Larceny Act of 1916 refers only to "taking."' 0 2 Significantly,
one finds judges relying on the10 3requirement of trespass
only in arguing against liability.
6. Liability of Finders
of larA. Traditional view: A finder of goods was not guilty
04
ceny, for there was no taking from possession.'
to know
B. Modern view: A finder is liable if he has reason
10 5
how to contact the owner, but fails to do so.
5.

Those radical discontinuities in the history of larceny are susceptible to a mode of explanation that has solid roots in social
theory. 10 6 The traditional views in the history of larceny suggest
one ideal type, pattern, or paradigm of thought; the newer views
coalesce as the expression of an opposing ideal type, pattern, or
paradigm. 0 7 In the concluding sections of this article, I shall de100. The classic texts do not mention the requirement of trespass in defining the prohibited taking. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *230-31; E. COKE, supra note 9,
at 107; 1 M. HALE, supra note 9, at 506. Yet I would not say that Professor Weinreb incorrectly describes the traditional conception of the crime in stating repeatedly that larceny requires a "trespassory taking." See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 4, at 297, 300. Nonetheless, it
would be hard to find a judicial opinion after 1800 that affirms liability on the basis of a
"tresspass" in the taking. Cf. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 1 (defining larceny
without referring to "trespass").
101. See the various opinions favoring liability in The Queen v. Middleton, L.R. 2 Cr.
Cas. Res. 38 (1873).
102. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50 § I.
103. See notes 142-43 infra.
104. See E. COKE, supra note 9, at 108; 1 M. HALE, supra note 9, at 506.
105. See Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 1(2)(i)(d).
106. An ideal type is a set of practices and perceptions that helps make sense of otherwise enigmatic acts. The locus classicus of the method is Max Weber's explication of the
ideal types of traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic authority. See M. WEBER, THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 328-62 (A. Henderson & T. Parsons
trans., T. Parsons ed. 1947). Individuals need not be aware of the ideal type that enables
their acts to have meaning to others. Id. at 111-12. Nor need the ideal ever be fully realized in a particular society. See M. WEBER, 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy, in
THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 50, 101-03 (E. Shils & H. Finch trans. & eds.
1949). The reliance on ideal types and related methods represents a growing trend in legal
scholarship. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977);

Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1712 (1976); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.
107. In my earlier effort to interpret the history of tort law, I borrowed from T. KUHN,
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scribe these ideal types and explain how they enable us to understand the older and newer conceptions of larceny.
A few preliminary remarks might avoid the ubiquitous misunderstanding one finds in Professor Weinreb's reading of my views.
This brief synopsis of the theory summarizes the fuller exposition
of the argument in Rethinking Criminal Law. 10 8 First, the theory
consists of an elaboration of ideal types that enables us to understand seemingly unrelated cases and doctrines in the evolution of
the common law. Whether those ideal types fit the data can hardly
be resolved by sending the relevant data through Lexis and
counting references to "manifest criminality" and "subjective criminality." Thus, in arguing that the judges and commentators do not
use those terms to explain their conclusions, Professor Weinreb
misses the point. The test of the theory is whether the ideal types
make sense of the radical discontinuities in the history of larceny.
If they help an open-minded reader to understand what others
have found obscure and mysterious, then the theory succeeds as an
interpretation of the historical events. If the theory fails to
illuminate the data, it fails as a theory. In neither event does the validity of the argument turn on whether others have used my language.
Second, the two ideal types, subjective and manifest criminality,
represent different interpretations of the venerable maxim that a
crime requires (I) an act, (2) an intent, and (3) the coincidence of
the act and the intent at some moment in time.'" Nowhere in my
work do I even suggest that either conception of criminality would
dispense with the requirement of criminal intent. Professor
Weinreb must be dueling with someone else when he argues that
manifest criminality leads to a form of strict liability. My point is
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) to argue that Kuhn's concept of
"paradigm" enables us to understand a major transformation in the system of tort liability.
See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. Rv. 537, 540 n.12 (1972). It
now seems to me, however, that there are, at a minimum, two major differences between
scientific revolutions and transformations in legal doctrine. First, a new scientific paradigm
totally displaces the old; the rejected paradigm does not continually reassert itself. The
"paradigm of reciprocity" and the "pattern of manifest criminality," by contrast, continue
to influence doctrinal disputes. Second, scientists tend to be fully aware of the paradigms
they reject and adopt. Lawyers, by contrast, function at a much lower level of selftonsciousness. For those reasons, the method of ideal types has more to contribute to legal
thought than does Kuhn's theory of paradigmatic change. Those and other methodological
issues are explored in my article, Two Modes of Legal Thought (forthicoming 90 YALE L.J.
(1981)).
108. RETHINKING at 115-234.
109. For further elaboration of the latent ambiguities in this maxim common to both
patterns of liability, see id. at 119-22.
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that the two ideal types represent different interpretations of what
it means to require an act and an intent. Neither ideal type dispenses with either requirement.
VIII. Subjective Criminality
As the dominant mode of thought, the conception of subjective
criminality is the more accessible of the two. Under this conception,
the intent to violate a protected legal interest constitutes the core of
the crime. The criminal act is important, but not as evidence of
what the perpetrator intended. The act might be expressly prohibited, such as "taking" the goods of another or "entering" a home
with the intent to commit a felony. In the subjective theories of attempts, of treason, and of conspiracy, any act in furtherance of the
criminal intent will suffice. The purpose of the act in the field of
inchoate offenses is not to reveal the content of the criminal intent,
but merely to demonstrate the firmness of intent. As Justice Douglas
repeatedly asserted, the purpose of the act required for treason is
merely to demonstrate that the "project has moved from the realm
of thought into the realm of action."1 10
If we review the modern conception of larceny, we find that all
the data conform comfortably to this paradigm of criminality. The
carrier's receiving the goods, Pear's mounting the horse,
Middleton's walking away with the excess cash, and a finder's picking up an object when he knows how to locate the owner all represent completed acts of larceny. Although the critical question is
whether the actor had the intent to steal, the act provides virtually
no evidence of the actor's intent. For evidence, the prosecution
would have to rely on a confession, on an admission, on the
incriminating effect of prior convictions, or on conduct before or
after the taking.
In the field of criminal attempts, the principle of subjective criminality finds its most striking application in the legislative trend toward punishing impossible attempts. Thus, according to a growing
number of revised state criminal codes, an individual's conduct
should be assessed according to the "attendant circumstances ... as
he believes them to be."' 11 If a would-be killer mistakes sugar for
arsenic and puts it in an enemy's coffee, his conduct unquestion110. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 645 (1947) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 61 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
111. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531(1) (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.011(2)
(Vernon 1979).
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ably constitutes attempted homicide. The act serves merely to demonstrate that the killer was serious about his purpose.
In drawing the line between preparation and attempt, the Model
Penal Code hedges against permitting any "'substantial step" in furtherance of the criminal intent to satisfy the requirement of a criminal act." 2 The Code adds the requirement that the act be
"strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose."' 3 This restriction has two flaws. First, it is a matter not of substance, but of
evidence; therefore, it is readily replaced by other forms of evidence. Second, it is flatly inconsistent with the Code's dispensing
with corroboration in the field of impossible attempts.' 1 4 It is not
surprising, then, that in the reception of the Model Penal Code,
the states have unhesitatingly abandoned the corroboration requirement. Of roughly twenty-five states that have revised their
codes in this area, seventeen now define a criminal attempt simply
as a "substantial step" in furtherance of the criminal intent.1 1 5 Of
these, only four require that the "substantial attempt" corroborate
the actor's intent or purpose."' The elimination of the corroboration requirement confirms the general drift toward the subjectivist
theory that intent is the critical element in a criminal attempt.
There is no reason, under this theory, to insist upon the act of attempting as a form of corroborating evidence.
The theory of subjective criminality should not appear novel: it
is, in fact, the reigning theory. It would hardly be interesting if it
did not stand in sharp contrast to a less fashionable conception of
criminality that stresses the manifest quality of the criminal act.
112. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962).
113. Id. § 5.01(2).
114. Set id. § 5.0l(1)(a), (b).
115. Among these 17, one finds an important distinction between states that require
that the act actually be a "substantial step" and states that extend liability to acts that are a
substantial step under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be. The first group
consists of 13 states. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-701(1)(b) (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-2-101(1) (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1001 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4 (SmithHurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-1(a) (Burns 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §

152(1) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.17 (West 1964); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-103
(1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.405 (1979); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 901 (Purdon 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.28.020 (1977). In contrast, four states take a subjective view of the "substantial
step" requirement, under which measures in the direction of an impossible attempt would
appear to be sufficient. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-49 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531
(1979); HAWAii REv. STAT. § 705-500 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 506.010(b) (1975).
116. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-701(1)(b) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-49 (1979);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 705-500 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1978). A few other
states require that the act corroborate the "firmness" of the intent. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §
18-2-101(1) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1976).
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IX. Manifest Criminality
The critical implication of subjective criminality is that an act
"quite innocent on its face" 117 may qualify as a criminal act. It does
not matter whether mounting the horse, taking the excess cash, or
putting the sugar into the coffee incriminates the actor. We trust
the police to elicit other forms of evidence to establish the required
intent. Confessions are good evidence, as are admissions to friends
of the suspect. Prior convictions will do, as will secretive conduct
after the incident.1 1 8
The principle of manifest criminality rejects the possibility of
convicting someone of larceny, burglary, treason, or attempt on the
basis of an act not incriminating on its face. The requirement of a
criminal act takes on a different meaning under this conception of
criminal behavior: the act must permit an inference of criminal intent. This is not to say, as I have always hastened to add, that the
act in any way replaces or deemphasizes the requirement of criminal intent. Although the two elements of manifest criminality are
lexically ordered, this means only that the first question in
analyzing liability is whether the act is of the sort that permits an
inference of criminal intent. The second question is always
whether, in the particular case, the evidence establishes the required intent beyond a reasonable doubt. We reach the issue of intent only if we first find a manifestly criminal act. But this ordering
does not render proof of intent any less necessary for liability. 119
It is easy to state the principles of manifest criminality and
equally easy to find dramatic instances in the cases. I shall begin by
discussing a recent case in the field of impossible attempts, then
turn to the reliance on manifest criminality in treason cases, and
finally bring the discussion back to the history of larceny.
In United States v. Oviedo,' 2 ° the defendant had engaged in conduct that would be readily classified as a punishable attempt under
the laws of most states. He had sold to an undercover agent a substance that both parties treated as heroin. It turned out, however,
to be procaine hydrochloride, an uncontrolled substance. The jury

117.

Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 646 (1947) (Douglas, J., concurring) (act

that is innocent on its face is sufficient to constitute treason under Constitution).
118. For expressions of concern about relying on this type of evidence, see United

States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976). The case is discussed below. See pp. 340-42
infra.
119.

For further elaboration of this conception

115-18, 232-33, 388, 471-72.
120.

340

525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976).

of criminality,

see RETHINKING at
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found that Oviedo had thought the substance was heroin and
therefore found him guilty of attempted distribution of heroin.
The framing of the issues on appeal is particularly significant.
Because of the jury's finding of intent, the court of appeals took
"as fact Oviedo's belief that the substance was heroin. 1 21 The sole
question on appeal was whether, as a matter of law, the sale qualified as a criminal act. The court of appeals concluded that it did
not, and reversed the conviction. The opinion reflects a strong
commitment to the principles of manifest criminality. Note the following passages:
Thus, we demand that in order for a defendant to be guilty of
a criminal attempt, the objective acts performed, without any
reliance on the accompanying mens rea, mark the defendant's
conduct as criminal in nature. The acts should be unique
rather than so commonplace that they are engaged in by persons not in violation of the law ....
. . . We cannot conclude that the objective acts of Oviedo
apart from any indirect evidence of intent mark his conduct as
criminal in nature. Rather, those acts are consistent with a
noncriminal enterprise ....
...[H]ere, Oviedo stated he would sell heroin and then sold
procaine. Based on these objective facts, we cannot infer that
he intended to do that which he said he was going to do, be12 2
cause he in fact did something else.
It might be difficult to grasp how the judges could both assume
that Oviedo intended to sell heroin and decide that, "because he in
fact did something else," they could not infer that he intended to
sell heroin. The paradox is easily resolved by recognizing the
court's implicit reliance on the distinction t 23 between a type of act
and a token of the type, namely, the particular act of the defendant.
This distinction helps to clarify the two stages for analyzing liability
under the principle of manifest criminality.
1.The type of act must permit an inference of criminal intent.
The inference might well fall short of proof beyond a reason-

121. Id. at 883.
122. Id. at 885-86.
123. The distinction between type and token has its roots in the philosophy of language. Nouns and verbs are word-types; a particular use of a noun or verb is a token of
that type. See Brody, Logical Terms, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 76 (1967).
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able doubt.' 2 4 Whether the act yields the required inference is
a question of law, resolved by the trial judge and subject to appellate review.
2. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that,
under the particular facts of the case, the defendant had the
requisite criminal intent.
If the defendant actually sold heroin to the undercover agent,
the type of act would permit an inference of intent. Yet, if there
was evidence that the defendant did not know the substance was
heroin, the prosecution would not be able to establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. In Oviedo, conversely, extrinsic evidence of secretive behavior induced the jury to find that the defendant believed the substance was heroin. 125 Yet, because the type of act was
ambiguous, the act was not a criminal attempt, and therefore the
intent was irrelevant.
There is no denying that the principles of manifest criminality
inform Oviedo and the analogous statutes and cases that insist that
the attempt "unequivocally" declare the actor's purpose. 126 The
same principles of criminality find clear expression in the treason
cases, in which the recurrent problem is whether the alleged giving
of aid and comfort to the enemy meets the constitutional threshold
of an "overt act." In United States v. Robinson,' 7 Judge Learned
Hand ruled that the act of traveling back and forth to Holland did
not meet the constitutional test, even though there was ample extrinsic evidence of the defendant's treasonous purpose. The flaw in
'2 8
the alleged act was that it did "not openly manifest any treason.'
In Haupt v. United States,'2 " the Supreme Court eventually rejected
this test for treasonous acts, but not without a vigorous dissent
from Justice Murphy. As the lone dissenter, Justice Murphy argued that the act requirement for treason had to be "'consistent
only with a treasonable intention."'' 30 Here, as in the field of attempts, we find indisputable evidence of judges committed to the

124. The strength of the required inference is left vague. See RE-THINKING at 232 ("The
act must bespeak danger, but it may do so in varying degress.")
125. 525 F.2d 881, 882 n.4 ("the procaine was secreted inside a television set").
126. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.32 (West 1958). Delaware and Kentucky define a
"substantial step" as an act or omission "which leaves no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to commit the crime." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 532 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 506.010(2) (1975).
127. 259 F. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
128. Id. at 690.
129. 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
130. Id. at 647 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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principle of manifest criminality in setting minimum requirements
for a finding of criminality.
Finally, let us return to the history of larceny and see whether
the requirement of an act that is incriminating on its face helps us
understand the relevant data. Rather than argue that the evidence
supports the thesis, I will simply list the data.
1. In selecting a rationale for The Carrier'sCase, all of the important common-law commentators fastened on the event that
obviously incriminated the carrier: the breaking open of the
bales.' 3 1 Blackstone explained the rule by stating that at that
moment "the animusfurandiis manifest." 132
2. In his opinion in The Carrier's Case, Nedeham used language that stresses the importance of clandestine behavior: "if
* . . I come secretly like a felon . . .and I take goods secretly
like a felon . .. . 33
3. A color of title, namely, the appearance of a rightful claim,
34
precluded commission of larceny.'
4. Receiving goods by delivery in the ordinary course of business could not, regardless of the actor's intent, constitute a
35
felonious taking.
5. Riding off with a horse already in one's possession could
not constitute larceny. Taking sheets from a hotel, silverware
from a restaurant, or a tie from a store, 1 36 by contrast, were all

131.

See note 14 supra.

132. 4 W.

BLACKSTONE,

supra note 9, at *230.

133. 64 SELDEN Soc'y, supra note 2, at 33. Nedeham was the only adviser to the King
who favored a finding of felony when the case was discussed in the Exchequer Chamber.
Id. at 33. His opinion discusses two other cases of felonious taking: where the possession is
terminated by delivery to the destination; and where one has custody but not possession.
Both of those examples are compatible with the thesis that Nedeham perceived the clandestine manner of taking as important in classifying the conduct as felony. Professor
Weinreb's argument to the contrary merely asserts, without evidence, that Nedeham must
have meant something different. See Weinreb, supra note 4, at 299. Nonetheless, I agree
with Professor Weinreb that one should not put too much empahsis on this or on any
other reported opinion of the discussion in the King's Council.
134. See p. 335 supra.
135. This model of a non-punishable taking influenced the court's reasoning in
Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 (1906) (defendant picked up meat barrels left for him as part of plan to catch him in act of stealing). The opinion is analyzed in
RETHINKING

at 72-76.

136. The last example comes from Chisser's Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 142 (K.B. 1678). According to the third paragraph of the opinion, the larceny occurred "when Chisser run
away with the goods." Id. at 143. Professor Weinreb concurs in this reading. Weinreb, supra
note 4, at 304 n.57. Yet, for reasons I do not understand, he does not wish to recognize an
ambiguity in the opinion that in fact supports his original reading of the history of larceny.
In Lord Raymond's report, the second paragraph of the opinion says that "the act subsequent, viz. his running away with them, explains his intent precedent." 83 Eng. Rep. at 142
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cases where the taker merely had custody and therefore could
be guilty of larceny.
6. In arguing against conviction in The Queen v. Middleton,
Bramwell stressed that the defendant's act
"was different from
13 7
taking."
forcible
or
a privy [clandestine]
7. In Middleton and in later cases, only judges arguing against
liability rely on the doctrines of delivery and trespass.1 38
It does not require a great leap of imagination to find that all of
those phenomena are informed by the principle that the courts
should punish only incriminating takings. The historical argument,
as I developed it in my earlier work,1 39 traces the principle of manifest criminality to the private execution of thefur manifestus (manifest thief) in Roman law and analogous practices in Greek and
Jewish law. The historical development, in brief, seems to have
proceeded in three basic stages: first, the private execution of manifest thieves; second, the public punishment of manifest and only
of manifest thieves; and third, the metamorphosis of larceny and
the ascendency of the subjective theory of larceny.
There is considerable indirect evidence for the view that prior to
the metamorphosis of larceny, our ancestors understood thieving
as conduct with a particular outward manifestation. Why do we use
the words "stealthful" and "furtive" as we do? Built into our notion
40
of stealthful behavior is a sense of stealing as an act on the sly.
An open taking "under a color of right" could not be larceny, re(emphasis in original). That language, and the example of larceny in fraudem legis cited
in support of it, id., supports East's conclusion that larceny in The King v. Pear, in The Carrier's Case, and in Chisser's Case occurred at T,, the time of receipt. Professor Weinreb's
casebook supports East's theory of larceny. L. WEINRaB, supra note 1, at 377. Now he ap-

parently disavows the evidence that supports him, for he claims that "[s]uch a reading of
[Chisser'sCase] is not serious." Weinreb, supra note 4, at 304 n.57.
137. L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 38, 56 (1873).
138. See p. 345 infra. Professor Weinreb treats "trespass" as an unproblematic element
in the definition of larceny. Yet his own efforts to define "trespassory taking" are inconsistent. At one point, he defines "physical trespass" simply as "an actual taking of property
from the possession of another person." Weinreb, supra note 4, at 310-11. On this definition,
one could hardly understand how the court in Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 109
N.W. 1037 (1906), could conclude that the taking of the barrels did not amount to a "trespass"; for surely Topolewski "took the property from the possession of another." At another point, Professor Weinreb stresses the element of "taking from possession against the
will of the possessor." Weinreb, supra note 4, at 306. Yet he never considers whether the
quality of trespass adds something to the elements of taking from possession and taking
against the will of the owner. Focusing on the additional quality of a "privy or forcible taking" might explain why, in the nineteenth century, only those opposed to liability relied on
the term "trespass."
139. See RETHINKING at 76-81; Fletcher, supra note 32, at 476-81.
140. The word "stealth" has the same origin as "steal." 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
884, 887 (1933). "Furtive" derives fromfur, the Latin word for thief. 4 id. at 620.
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gardless of the intent. Keeping something under one's control
could not be larceny, regardless of the intent. Yet taking goods in a
manner that was unusual and suspicious-sheets from a hotel, silverware from a restaurant, a tie from a store-that was larceny.14 1
In many modern cases, judges have used the word "trespass" to
capture the moment of clandestine or forcible behavior in a larcenous taking. 142 Thus, the dissent in Middleton spoke of trespass in
objecting to the conviction of someone whose taking of excess cash
from a bank teller was hardly incriminating. Similarly, the court in
the case of State v. Topolewski invoked the idiom of trespass to express its intuition that excessively facilitating a taking deprived the
act of precisely those qualities that could render it felonious. 143
In this brief sketch of the theory, I shall not rehearse the
broader social and philosophical implications of the fall of manifest
criminality and rise of subjective criminality. 44 These broader issues lie far beyond the range of the present debate in which I contend only that we cannot understand the history of larceny without
elaborating conflicting conceptions of criminality. Historical understanding requires that we probe beyond Professor Weinreb's banal
thesis that the law of larceny reflects "the interplay between legal
doctrine and changing social perceptions." 145
X.

Objections to Manifest Criminality
Interpretive theories never persuade everyone. Yet they rarely
have the power to engender the kind of reaction we have witnessed
in Professor Weinreb's article. Let me see if I can sort out his arguments against my theory. The basic move is to deny that there are
any discontinuities in the history of larceny, and hence that there is
any evidence in need of interpretation. The second move is to
invoke a normative argument against my historical account. The
normative claim is that a preoccupation with manifest criminality is
dangerous, for it could lead to disregarding intent altogether.146
141. For a survey of those cases, see RETHINKING at 61-66.
142. See, e.g., The Queen v. Middleton, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 38, 53 (1873) (Martin, B.,
dissenting); id. at 57-58 (Bramwell, B., dissenting).
143. It is significant that in Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 (1906),
the court's opinion never says directly that the facilitation of the taking amounted to a delivery. It hedges the argument by saying that the company's setting out of the barrels was a
delivery -in practical effect." Id. at 256, 109 N.W. at 1041. For a full analysis of the rhetoric in the opinion, particularly of the significance of using the terms "'delivery," "consent,"
and "trespass," see RETHINKING at 70-76, 86-88.
144. For fuller elaboration, see RETHINKING at 100-02.

145.
146.

Weinreb, supra note 4, at 309.
Id. at 318.
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The third move is to attack the coherence of manifest criminality
by stressing the difficulty of resolving borderline cases. That the
standard is fuzzy at the fringes suggests perhaps that no rational
person would take it seriously. In any event, we should no longer
urge the principle in fields like attempts.
The first two objections need no longer detain us.' 47 The third
move, however, raises some intriguing points. There is no doubt
that one can find borderline cases of manifest larceny. But does it
follow that there are no clear cases? If there are borderline cases of
causation, negligence, malice, insanity, and duress, does it follow
that those concepts have no core of undisputed application? In
fact, of course, most of the important concepts in the law find clear
application in some cases and disputed application in others.' 48
In seeking to understand the history of larceny, the important
question to ask is not whether a particular person today can effectively apply the principle of manifest criminality to borderline
cases. Rather, we should ask whether we can imagine others proceeding toward their decisions by responding implicitly to the principle. In order to establish that point, it seems to me, I need only
demonstrate that some cases are relatively clearer instances of manifest criminality than others. If it is possible to rank cases by the degree to which conduct reveals the intent, then it is possible to begin
discussing how manifestly criminal the behavior was required to be
for different offenses at different stages of history. Let us consider,
then, the following ordered pairs of acts:
1. It is more indicative of a treasonous purpose (A) to give an
enemy agent a military map 149 than (B) to meet with an enemy
agent at a restaurant. 150
2. It is more indicative of a murderous intent (A) to put an ineffective dose of poison in someone's coffee1 5 ' than (B) to put
1 52
sugar in his coffee.
147. I have attempted to refute the first objection by restating the discontinuities in the
history of larceny. See pp. 334-36 supra. The second objection rests on a misreading of my
argument that confuses manifest criminality with strict liability. See pp. 337-38, 340 supra.
148. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-37 (1961).
149. Justice Murphy gave this as an example of an overt act of giving aid and comfort
to the enemy that would be "consistent only with a treasonable intention." Haupt v. United
States, 330 U.S. 631, 647 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
150. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (conviction reversed because government failed to allege and prove overt act of giving aid and comfort to enemy).
151. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1897); State v.
Glover, 27 S.C. 602, 4 S.E. 564 (1888).
152. See State v. Clarissa, I1 Ala. 57 (1847) (conviction for attempted murder reversed
because indictment did not allege that putative poison was toxic); The Queen v. Osborn,
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3. It is more indicatiyve of an intent to commit a felony inside a
153 than (B) to
house (A) to enter at night through the chimney
13 4
enter during the day through the front door.
4. It is more indicative of animus furandi for someone in possession of another's package (A) to open the package and remove the contents' 55 than (B) to keep the package substantially
56
longer than he should.'
5. It is more indicative of animusfurandi (A) for a passenger to
leave an airplane with silverware provided at dinner 5 7 than
(B) for a mechanic impermissibly to use a car given to him for
,8
repairY
6. It is more indicative of animus furandi (A) for a suspected
thief to enter a house, open a desk drawer, and remove the
contents1 5 9 than (B) for a suspected thief to remove barrels of
meat left for him on the loading dock of a packing com60
pany.'

All that the theory of manifest criminality requires is that we are
able to order those cases in that way. If we can do so, then we can

consider the possibility that, upon finding the requisite intent
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, some judges and commentators
would favor liability for the first, more incriminating acts in each of
those six pairs, but reject liability for the second, less incriminating
84 J.P. 63 (1920) (prescribing innocuous substance as abortifacient would not support liability for attempt to procure abortion).
153. Entering through the chimney constituted "breaking" in common-law burglary. 4

W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *226; 1 M. HALE, supra note 9, at 552.
154. This hypothetical situation is a composite of two elements: a daytime entry, which
is presumably less likely to be threatening than the nighttime entry required at common
law, see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *224, and an entry through the front door,
which would not have been a "breaking" at common law, see id. at *226.
155. This, of course, was the situation in The Carrier'sCase. See pp. 320-21 supra.
156. See p. 320 supra (describing hypothetical Clever Carrier's Case). In an effort to
make the behavior of the clever carrier appear criminal, Professor Weinreb suggestively
says of the clever carrier that he "sells the bales intact to a stranger, pockets the proceeds,
and departs." Weinreb, supra note 4, at 303. Note the additional act of "pocketing the proceeds," which obviously connotes surreptitious behavior. The clever carrier's conduct is less
incriminating; for compared with breaking open the bales, the act of selling the goods at
market is much more likely to be the authorized act of a servant.
157. Nedeham's opinion in The Carrier'sCase gives a similar example as an illustration
of felonious taking. 64 SELnEN Soc'Y, supra note 2, at 33.
158. The mechanic would enjoy immunity from the liability for larceny, because, as
Coke said, "he hath the possession of it once lawfully." E. CoKE, supra note 9, at 107. For a
discussion of this principle of immunity, see RETHINKING at 81-83.
159. See The King v. Egginton, 168 Eng. Rep. 555 (1801) (conviction upheld despite effort by owner to set trap for thieves).
160. Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 (1906) (conviction reversed on
ground that effort to set trap went too far and deprived taking of quality of trespass).
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acts. Entertaining that possibility might make one receptive to the
thesis that particular doctrinal disputes respond to conceptually
deeper concerns about the manifestly criminal nature of the allegedly criminal act.
Explicating the internal tensions in our present and past law requires some normative flexibility. I would never have come upon
the principle of manifest criminality unless the values that it represents had some claim on me. Indeed, there is much to be said for
those values.1 6 1 Yet the metamorphosis of larceny would never
have occurred unless there were persuasive considerations favoring
the principles of subjective criminality. Not surprisingly, there are
strong arguments for and against each conception of criminality. 16 2
Though I tend to side with the principles of manifest criminality, a
preference for one side is not as important as recognizing the existence of basic ideological conflict in the legal system.
161. See RETHINKING at 88-90. For a more elaborate defense of the values implicit in
the pattern of manifest criminality, see Fletcher, Legality as Privacy, in LIBERTY AND THE
RULE OF LAW 482 (R. Cunningham ed. 1979).

162. For a strong argument against restricting the law of treason to manifestly criminal
conduct, see Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 32 (1945) ("Treason-insidious and dangerous treason-is the work of the shrewd and crafty more often than of the simple and
impulsive.") The same argument applies to the law of larceny and attempt. For a review of
other arguments bearing on the conflict between subjective and manifest criminality, particularly in the law of attempts, see RETHINKING at 139-84.
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